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GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
  3 
The Attorney General of Pennsylvania (the 
“Commonwealth”) appeals from an order of the District Court 
dated December 29, 2011, denying the Commonwealth‟s motion 
to dismiss the habeas corpus proceedings brought by the 
petitioner, Timothy J. Ross, as untimely and granting equitable 
tolling from the one-year statute of limitations of the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), in this action under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254.  The Commonwealth also appeals from a subsequent 
order of the District Court dated March 16, 2012, granting Ross 
substantive habeas corpus relief.   
This case arose in the aftermath of Ross‟s conviction of 
first degree murder by a jury in the Franklin County, 
Pennsylvania, Common Pleas Court on June 14, 2000, and his 
sentence based on that conviction of life imprisonment on June 
21, 2000.  For reasons that we will explain, Ross was unable to 
obtain a state appellate court review of his conviction and 
sentence.  He subsequently brought this habeas corpus case 
charging that because his attorney wrongfully abandoned him, 
he lost his appellate rights in violation of the Sixth Amendment.
1
 
                                                 
1We recognize that this right is founded in the Due Process 
Clause.  While Ross does not have a constitutional right to 
appeal, see McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 14 S.Ct. 913 
(1894), “if a State has created appellate courts . . ., the 
procedures used in deciding appeals must comport with the 
demands of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of 
the Constitution.”  Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393, 105 
S.Ct. 830, 834 (1985).  Consequently, “[a] first appeal as of 
right . . . is not adjudicated in accord with due process of law 
  4 
 Although the AEDPA statute of limitations, in terms, barred 
this action as untimely, the District Court found that equitable 
tolling of the running of the statute was warranted because Ross 
had been diligent in pursuing his state court appellate remedies 
but that extraordinary circumstances beyond his control 
frustrated this attempt.   
The District Court reached its conclusion with respect to 
equitable tolling by adopting a report and recommendation of a 
magistrate judge that he submitted to the Court following an 
evidentiary hearing on November 3, 2011.  The testimony at the 
hearing demonstrated that Ross, though diligent in attempting to 
prosecute what should have been a routine appeal in the state 
courts, was unsuccessful in this attempt by reason of 
extraordinary circumstances attributable to his attorney‟s 
extreme neglect of his case.  This neglect included the attorney 
missing deadlines for filing documents with the state courts, the 
attorney‟s failure to communicate with Ross, and the attorney‟s 
misleading statements when he did communicate with Ross.  
Moreover, when Ross sought to remedy the situation by filing a 
motion for appointment of a new attorney, the Common Pleas 
Court denied his motion.  Ross‟s mental health issues, limited 
education, and limited cognitive ability magnified his problems. 
 Moreover, Ross‟s status as a prison inmate placed structural 
obstacles in his path when he attempted to pursue state court 
appellate proceedings.  Subsequently, on March 16, 2012, the 
District Court adopted a second report and recommendation by 
the magistrate judge and in so doing granted Ross substantive 
                                                                                                             
if the appellant does not have the effective assistance of an 
attorney.”  Id. at 398, 105 S.Ct. at 836 (footnote omitted).  
  5 
relief for the same reasons that it denied the Commonwealth‟s 
motion to dismiss his petition.  The magistrate judge based the 
second report and recommendation on the same record on which 
he had predicated his original report and recommendation.  The 
District Court‟s order required the Commonwealth to reinstate 
Ross‟s direct appeal from his conviction within 90 days.   
On this appeal the Commonwealth contests the District 
Court‟s findings and argues that the Court incorrectly applied 
equitable tolling principles.  According to the Commonwealth, 
Ross did not diligently pursue his appellate rights between 2004 
and 2008, despite being required to do so continuously during 
the entire period in which he was exhausting his state remedies, 
as required to preserve his claim for equitable relief from the 
AEDPA‟s statute of limitations, prior to bringing these habeas 
corpus proceedings.  For the reasons that we set forth, we will 
affirm the District Court‟s decision and order tolling the running 
of the statute of limitations with respect to Ross‟s habeas 
petition, so that the filing of the petition will be deemed timely.  
We also will affirm its grant of a writ of habeas corpus on the 
same basis that the Court tolled the running of the statute of 
limitations.  We, however, will remand the case to the District 
Court with instructions to modify its order that the 
Commonwealth reinstate Ross‟s appeal, and, instead, to order 
Ross‟s release within 90 days unless the Commonwealth 
reinstates Ross‟s right to appeal from his conviction and 
sentence within that period.
2
 
                                                 
2Throughout this opinion when we refer to the District Court 
making findings of fact we are referring to the Court adopting 
  6 
II.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The details of the proceedings in the state courts 
following Ross‟s sentencing in the Common Pleas Court are 
convoluted and lengthy, but inasmuch as it is necessary to 
understand them to make an analysis of the equitable tolling 
issue, we recite them in great detail.  The facts largely were 
developed at the evidentiary hearing before the magistrate judge, 
though much of the record in this case consists of documents 
filed in the state courts.  
As we have indicated, Ross was convicted of first degree 
murder on June 14, 2000, in the Common Pleas Court.
3
   In an 
order dated July 11, 2000, that court appointed an attorney, 
                                                                                                             
the magistrate judge‟s report and recommendation making the 
findings.  As a matter of convenience we will refer to the 
Franklin County Common Pleas Court simply as the Common 
Pleas Court as the only state trial court proceedings in this 
matter were in Franklin County.   
 
3
The murder appears to have been precipitated by a bar fight.  
Though we have not studied the transcripts of the trial as we 
have had no need to do so to resolve the narrow issue before 
us, we note that the parties‟ briefs indicate that Ross had been 
arguing in a bar with the victim, Drake Luckett, and exited the 
bar shortly before Luckett.  When Luckett left the bar, Ross 
shot him three times in the chest.  Luckett was alive when the 
police arrived but subsequently died of his wounds.  
Appellant‟s br. at 12; Appellee‟s br. at 4. 
 
  7 
Christopher Sheffield, to represent Ross in “all post-sentence 
proceedings including appeal.”  In the same order, the court 
stayed the time for filing an amended post-sentence motion by 
ten days “to permit new counsel to consult with Mr. Ross.”4  
J.A. at 328.   
Following Sheffield‟s appointment, Ross wrote to 
Sheffield in July, September, and October 2000 suggesting 
strategies for his appeal and asking for basic information as to 
the status of his case.  When Sheffield did not respond, Ross 
also wrote to his trial attorney asking for his assistance because 
Sheffield had not contacted him.  Ross‟s former attorney 
forwarded Ross‟s correspondence to Sheffield on October 9, 
2000.  Sheffield did not respond to any of these four letters sent 
over a period of approximately two and one-half months.   
Furthermore, Sheffield did not file a post-sentence motion 
within the extended ten-day period the Common Pleas Court 
allowed for the filing of such a motion when it appointed him to 
represent Ross. 
On October 16, 2000, Ross wrote to the clerk of the 
Common Pleas Court to inquire about what steps he might take 
                                                 
4Under Pennsylvania‟s post-sentencing procedures, a 
defendant must file a post-sentence motion within 10 days of 
the imposition of sentence for it to be timely.  If the defendant 
files a timely post-sentence motion he then has 30 days after 
the order on the motion is entered to file a notice of appeal.  If 
the defendant does not file a timely post-sentence motion, he 
has 30 days from the imposition of the sentence to file an 
appeal.  234 Pa. Code § 720. 
  8 
to pursue his appeal.  On December 11, 2000, five months after 
the Common Pleas Court appointed him to represent Ross, 
Sheffield, without informing Ross, filed a motion in that court 
on Ross‟s behalf for leave to appeal nunc pro tunc.  The court 
granted this motion on December 13, 2000.  On January 1, 2001, 
Ross wrote to the judge assigned to his case in the Common 
Pleas Court, explaining that he had not heard anything about his 
case since the court had appointed Sheffield to represent him.  
Ross also filed a pro se motion for appointment of a new 
attorney on January 5, 2001.  On January 11, 2001, the court 
denied this motion because “the record indicates that petitioner‟s 
court-appointed counsel recently filed a motion for transcripts 
and leave to file an appeal nunc pro tunc, which was granted by 
this court on December 13, 2000.”  J.A. at 270.   
On January 15, 2001, after receiving a copy of this order 
denying his motion from the court, Ross wrote an apologetic 
letter to Sheffield in which he requested copies of the appeal 
documents in his case and emphasized how important the appeal 
was to him because he was serving a term of life in prison.  
However, despite the many beseeching letters from his client, 
Sheffield did not file a notice of appeal to the Superior Court of 
Pennsylvania until May 9, 2001, six months after the Common 
Pleas Court granted him leave to do so, and then, apparently, 
only in reaction to a phone call that the Common Pleas Court 
made to him indicating its concern that it had not yet seen an 
appeal filed.
5
  Ross testified at the evidentiary hearing before the 
                                                 
5
Sheffield sent the following letter to the Common Pleas 
Court on May 9, 2001:  “Dear Judge Walker, The Court 
Administrator called me, and upon my return call he informed 
  9 
magistrate judge that he did not receive a copy of that notice of 
appeal.  On June 8, 2001, a month after receiving the telephone 
call from the court, Sheffield visited Ross in prison for the first 
and only time during the approximately eight years that he was 
Ross‟s attorney of record and at that meeting assured Ross that 
his appeal was moving forward.  During the meeting Ross 
stressed that he had sent several letters to Sheffield outlining the 
issues he felt needed to be raised on appeal.
6
   
Notwithstanding his representation to Ross that his 
appeal was going forward, on June 11, 2001, Sheffield filed a 
petition with the Common Pleas Court for leave to withdraw 
Ross‟s direct appeal and, instead, to file post-trial motions nunc 
pro tunc for the purpose of establishing an ineffective trial 
counsel claim.  Sheffield explained in this petition that, after his 
meeting with Ross, “it became evident” to him, apparently for 
the first time in the almost full year that he had represented 
Ross, “that there are issues regarding ineffectiveness of trial 
counsel” and that those issues must “be decided by the trial 
court and a record on those issues be made prior to continuing 
on direct appeal.”   Id. at 276-77.  Though our result is not 
dependent on the point, we believe that in filing this petition 
Sheffield was implying that he intended to submit these post-
trial motions pursuant to Pennsylvania‟s Post Conviction Relief 
                                                                                                             
me of your concern regarding proceeding in the [J.K. case] 
and the above referenced [Ross case.]”  J.A. at 272. 
 
6The record also indicates that Sheffield‟s purpose in visiting 
Ross was in part to interview Ross about his former cellmate 
whom Sheffield also was representing.   
  10 
Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9541 et seq. (West 1998).  
Sheffield, however, did not refer to the PCRA in his petition for 
leave to withdraw the appeal and could not answer questions 
about the PCRA at the evidentiary hearing before the magistrate 
judge.   
The Common Pleas Court granted the petition on June 
18, 2001, to the extent of giving Ross leave to petition the 
Superior Court to withdraw his direct appeal.  Moreover, the 
Common Pleas Court instructed Sheffield to file post-trial 
motions in Ross‟s case within 30 days after what it correctly 
anticipated would be the grant by the Superior Court of the 
petition to withdraw Ross‟s direct appeal.7  On August 30, 2001, 
two months and 12 days after the Common Pleas Court granted 
his petition, Sheffield filed a petition with the Superior Court to 
withdraw Ross‟s direct appeal, which the Superior Court granted 
on September 4, 2001.  Sheffield, however, never filed post-trial 
motions with the Common Pleas Court, despite that court having 
directed him to do so within 30 days of the Superior Court‟s 
anticipated grant of his petition to withdraw Ross‟s direct 
appeal.     
In addition to the letters to which we already have 
                                                 
7
The Common Pleas Court gave this instruction because 
Sheffield should have submitted the motion to withdraw the 
appeal originally to the Superior Court, a further indication (in 
addition to Sheffield‟s testimony on November 3, 2011, 
before the magistrate judge) that Sheffield was not well-
versed in appellate procedures in criminal cases in 
Pennsylvania.   
  11 
referred, there are copies of seven additional letters in the record 
dated June 26, 2001, October 17, 2001, January 7, 2003, March 
31, 2003, May 18, 2003, June 14, 2003, and September 6, 2003, 
from Ross to Sheffield inquiring about the status of his appeal.  
On December 3, 2001, Sheffield‟s secretary wrote a brief letter 
to Ross indicating that she shortly would be sending him a copy 
of his original trial transcript, and the record indicates that Ross 
received the transcript later that month.  The District Court 
noted in describing this communication that “even as counsel 
provided this rudimentary information to Ross, he failed to 
disclose a greater truth to the petitioner . . . that he had 
withdrawn Ross‟ appeal months earlier, and had taken no further 
action to pursue any post-conviction relief for Ross.”   J.A. at 
58.   
The record contains only three letters from Sheffield to 
Ross in response to Ross‟s inquiries, all written between March 
and September 2003.  In a March 25, 2003 letter Sheffield 
informed Ross that he “just noticed [Ross‟s] letter of January 8, 
2003 in the file.  I will be following up on your matter to see 
exactly where it stands.”8 Id. at 301 (emphasis added).  Two 
months later in a May 30, 2003 letter to Ross, Sheffield implied 
that the Superior Court had misplaced Ross‟s file, and assured 
Ross that he would take appropriate action once the file was 
located, or within a short period of time if the file could not be 
                                                 
8
 It seems clear from the record that Sheffield was referring to 
Ross‟s letter dated January 7, 2003, the postmark of which 
was January 8, 2003. 
 
  12 
located.
9
  In a September 11, 2003 letter to Ross, Sheffield 
indicated that he would file a nunc pro tunc appeal by the end of 
that month but, in fact, he never filed that appeal or, for that 
matter, any other appeal for Ross other than the appeal that the 
Superior Court had dismissed on Sheffield‟s petition.     
On February 8, 2004, Ross wrote to the clerk of the 
Common Pleas Court requesting a copy of the docket in his case 
so that he could determine whether Sheffield had filed a nunc 
pro tunc appeal as he had promised.  There is then a gap in the 
paper record, at least as presented on this appeal, until four years 
later, when, on April 15, 2008, Ross again wrote to the clerk of 
the court requesting an update on the status of the appeal, which 
                                                 
9Sheffield‟s letter recited that:  “I believe your file was never 
returned from Superior Court from the [sic] when we filed a 
Motion to withdraw your appeal and seed [sic] instead Post-
trial motions as we discussed.  Once your file is located, or 
within a short time even if your file is not located, I will be 
moving to place your matter back on the court docket.”  J.A. 
at 309.  There is, however, no indication in the record of 
which we are aware to support Sheffield‟s assertion that the 
Superior Court somehow misplaced or misdirected the file in 
Ross‟s case.  Sheffield went on to suggest in that same letter 
that when he did make a motion “to place your matter back on 
the court docket, . . . [i]t may be through an appeal Nunc Pro 
Tunc, as you suggest, although technically it appears that you 
have never lost your immediate right to an appeal so I would 
not recommend jumping immediately to a Nunc Pro Tunc 
position.”  Id. 
 
  13 
he had been led to believe that Sheffield had filed on his behalf. 
 Although there is no paper trail on the point, in testimony which 
the District Court accepted as true, Ross testified that he 
repeatedly and regularly called
10
 and wrote Sheffield between 
2004 and 2008, and also enlisted his father‟s help to 
communicate with Sheffield, but that his efforts were fruitless.  
In addition, after receiving a copy of the docket from the clerk 
of the Common Pleas Court in 2004, Ross unsuccessfully 
attempted to find a “jailhouse attorney” to represent him.  Id. at 
231.       
In addition to seeking relief by having Sheffield file a 
direct appeal for him, on June 26, 2008, Ross, acting pro se, 
filed a Common Pleas Court petition for post-conviction 
collateral relief, a step that Sheffield never had undertaken on 
his behalf.  It appears that Ross, by filing his petition, caused the 
Common Pleas Court to take action in his case for, on July 2, 
2008, that court appointed a new attorney, Joseph Curcillo, to 
represent Ross.   
On July 10, 2009, Curcillo filed an amended PCRA 
motion to reinstate Ross‟s appellate rights with the Common 
Pleas Court.
11
  On November 17, 2009, the Common Pleas 
                                                 
10
Ross testified that it was his habit to call Sheffield 
approximately twice a month, but that usually Sheffield‟s 
office refused to take his calls.  Sheffield confirmed that his 
office would not always accept collect calls from inmates.   
 
11
It is unclear why Curcillo did not file this motion until more 
than one year after his appointment.  We note, however, that 
  14 
Court, noting that the Commonwealth had agreed to the order, 
entered an order reinstating Ross‟s appellate rights nunc pro 
tunc and giving Ross and his attorney what seems to us to be a 
generous period of 120 days to file an appeal from the 
underlying conviction and sentence.  Curcillo filed a notice of 
appeal to the Superior Court on January 28, 2010, within the 
120-day period, and on February 5, 2010, in response to 
Curcillo‟s motion, the Common Pleas Court granted Ross in 
forma pauperis status.  On February 24, 2010, Curcillo 
submitted a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal 
to the Common Pleas Court, which transmitted the case to the 
Superior Court on March 23, 2010.   
On September 28, 2010, the Superior Court issued a per 
curiam order reversing the November 17, 2009 order of the 
Common Pleas Court that had granted Ross relief under the 
PCRA allowing him to appeal from his conviction and 
sentence.
12
  Ross then filed another pro se PCRA petition in the 
                                                                                                             
the Common Pleas Court docket indicates that there was 
additional correspondence from Ross to the court in June 
2009. 
 
12
The District Court concluded that when the Superior Court 
reversed the Common Pleas Court‟s reinstatement of Ross‟s 
direct appeal rights, an action in which the Commonwealth 
had acquiesced, “in a telling and tacit recognition of the 
extraordinary circumstances of this case,” the Superior Court 
evidently had been “unaware of Ross‟ tortured history with 
his prior counsel [and therefore] simply found that the appeal 
did not fall within any clearly recognized statutory exceptions 
  15 
Common Pleas Court, contending that Curcillo had been 
ineffective.  However, on November 10, 2010, that court, in an 
order including language suggesting that it believed the Superior 
Court opinion had required it to enter, dismissed the petition. 
On November 24, 2010, Ross again filed an appeal to the 
Superior Court in the Common Pleas Court, this time from the 
November 10, 2010 order.   Ross also again moved in the 
Common Pleas Court for leave to proceed in forma pauperis.  
On December 1, 2010, the Common Pleas Court granted Ross‟s 
motion to proceed in forma pauperis and gave him 21 days to 
submit a statement of errors complained of on appeal.  On 
December 20, 2010 (seemingly mindful of the court‟s 21-day 
deadline for submission of a statement of errors), Ross withdrew 
his November 24, 2010 appeal, and, instead, on December 28, 
2010, filed a petition for post-conviction collateral relief in the 
Common Pleas Court.  That court, however, denied the petition 
on January 10, 2011.     
Following a decade of procedural frustration in the state 
courts, Ross filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
(the “habeas petition”) in the District Court on May 4, 2011.  On 
June 7, 2011, the Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss the 
                                                                                                             
under the state post-conviction relief act, authorizing 
reinstatement of appellate rights.”  J.A. at 62.  The District 
Court concluded that it was “[o]n the basis of this reading of 
state law, and without the benefit of the disturbing factual 
context of this case” that the Superior Court had “quashed and 
dismissed Ross‟ appeal.”  Id. 
 
  16 
habeas petition, arguing that it was statutorily untimely and that 
the running of the statute of limitations should not be equitably 
tolled to render the habeas petition timely because although a 
“duly diligent petitioner may be allowed some time in order to 
realize that he has been abandoned by counsel, . . . five years is 
clearly too long.”  Id. at 147.  In particular, the Commonwealth 
contended that Ross had not been reasonably diligent between 
the time that Sheffield wrote him on September 11, 2003, and 
the time Ross once again began his direct communications with 
the Common Pleas Court on April 15, 2008.  The District Court 
appointed an attorney to represent Ross in the habeas corpus 
proceedings on July 18, 2011, and deferred ruling on the motion 
to dismiss.     
The District Court referred the habeas petition to a 
magistrate judge who conducted the evidentiary hearing to 
which we have made reference on November 3, 2011, on the 
motion to dismiss the habeas petition.  During that hearing, Ross 
and Sheffield testified with respect to Ross‟s claim that 
Sheffield had abandoned him.  There also was testimony 
addressing Ross‟s efforts to pursue his appeal.13  Sheffield‟s 
                                                 
13
Both the Commonwealth and Ross were aware that the 
findings of fact resulting from the hearing on the motion to 
dismiss would be directly pertinent to the issue of equitable 
tolling with respect to both the motion to dismiss and, if that 
motion was denied, the substantive disposition of the habeas 
petition.  In this regard, at the beginning of that hearing the 
magistrate judge stated: “I have spoken with the parties before 
this proceeding began and have noted for them that it is my 
view that there is a substantial overlap between the factual 
  17 
testimony was remarkable because he seemed to know very little 
about Ross‟s case, a circumstance that he attributed to the fact 
that he had sent the file in Ross‟s case to Curcillo, Ross‟s new 
attorney. 
As we stated previously, Ross testified that he regularly 
attempted to telephone and correspond with Sheffield between 
2004 and 2008.  Ross, however, was unable to produce any 
documentation supporting his claim that he made those efforts 
because there was no record of his telephone calls, and much of 
the documentation reflecting his written attempts had been lost 
during his transfers among different correctional facilities.
14
  
                                                                                                             
issues that need to be addressed on this question of 
abandonment for purposes of statute of limitations and the 
issue of whether the abandonment, if found, would constitute 
a violation that would entitle the petitioner for relief, that is, 
reinstatement of direct appellate rights.  And it is my 
understanding that the parties agree with me that there is a 
substantial factual overlap there, although that there are 
substantial factual issues that have to be developed here 
today.  Is that correct, Counsel?”  At that time the attorneys 
agreed with the magistrate judge‟s statements.  J.A. at 153.   
 
14
The record indicates that certain documentation was lost, 
perhaps because of the practice of the Pennsylvania prison 
authorities to leave the packing of a prisoner‟s personal effects 
to the prisoner‟s cellmate when the prisoner is being relocated.  
In these circumstances, Ross‟s testimony that he had lost 
possessions when being moved to a different facility is hardly 
surprising.   
  18 
Ross also testified at the evidentiary hearing that Sheffield‟s 
office often did refuse to take his calls, and Sheffield‟s 
testimony indicated that sometimes his office did refuse to take 
inmates‟ calls, particularly if Sheffield was not available to 
speak to the inmate.  As we have indicated, however, Sheffield 
could not recall the details of Ross‟s case, nor could he testify as 
to the proper avenues of appeal or to post-conviction motion 
procedures under Pennsylvania law.  Overall, Ross‟s and 
Sheffield‟s testimony, to the extent that Sheffield knew anything 
about Ross‟s case, was not inconsistent. 
On November 4, 2011, the magistrate judge issued his 
report and recommendation (the “first R&R”), recommending 
that the District Court deny the Commonwealth‟s motion to 
dismiss Ross‟s habeas petition.  The District Court adopted the 
first R&R in an order of December 29, 2011, in which it 
remanded the case to the magistrate judge for consideration of 
the habeas petition on the merits.     
Subsequently, on January 11, 2012, the magistrate judge 
issued a report and recommendation on the merits of the habeas 
petition (the “second R&R”),15 recommending to the District 
                                                                                                             
 
15
Each of the magistrate judge‟s reports and recommendations 
(both of which were issued after the evidentiary hearing held 
on November 3, 2011) contained a “Statement of Facts and of 
the Case.”  These two statements of facts are substantively 
identical, with very limited variations in wording or grammar 
in a few places. 
 
  19 
Court that it grant the petition and that Ross “be granted narrow 
relief in the form of reinstatement of his direct appeal rights in 
state court, a direct appeal denied Ross through the inaction of 
his first state post-conviction counsel.”  Id. at 78.  The second 
R&R noted that the record demonstrated that Ross “diligently 
sought to pursue a direct appeal for years, only to be frustrated 
in those efforts by his own counsel.”  Id. at 75.  Thus, though the 
findings were not comprehensively set forth with respect to the 
2004-2008 period, it is evident that the magistrate judge and, 
accordingly, the District Court, believed that Sheffield had 
ignored Ross‟s correspondence, refused his phone calls, did not 
take the necessary steps to preserve Ross‟s appellate rights even 
when Ross prompted him to do so, and made misleading 
statements and gave false assurances to Ross regarding the 
status of the appeal.
16
  The District Court found that the facts in 
this case were extraordinary, particularly when considered in 
light of Ross‟s limited intelligence and education, his status as 
an incarcerated prisoner,
17
 and the Common Pleas Court‟s denial 
                                                 
16In fact in his first R&R the magistrate judge pointed out that, 
although Ross‟s documentation supporting his diligence 
“became . . . sparse from 2004 through 2008, Ross testified 
without contradiction, that he continued to try to pursue his 
appeals during these years and some documentation supports 
this testimony.”  J.A. at 46 n.6.  We are uncertain as to what 
this documentation was as it does not seem to be in the 
record.  In any event, we are deciding this case on the basis of 
our belief that there is no such documentation. 
 
17
The difficulties of this status included having limited 
financial and other resources with which to pursue an appeal, 
  20 
of his motion for the appointment of a new attorney to replace 
Sheffield.  The order denying Ross‟s motion for the appointment 
of a new attorney was particularly significant because it recited 
that Ross‟s attorney had sought and obtained an order allowing 
him to appeal nunc pro tunc, thus implying that Sheffield was 
prosecuting the appeal, a statement on which Ross relied.   
On March 16, 2012, the District Court issued an order 
adopting the second R&R, thus granting Ross‟s habeas petition, 
and ordered the Commonwealth to reinstate Ross‟s direct 
appellate rights within 90 days.  The Commonwealth has filed a 
timely appeal from that order which, though recited to be only 
from the March 16, 2012 order, includes an appeal from the 
order of December 29, 2011, denying the Commonwealth‟s 
motion to dismiss.
18
   
                                                                                                             
as well as problems caused by being moved within 
correctional facilities, resulting, as we have noted, in a loss of 
his personal records. 
 
18Under the “merger rule” because notices of appeal are 
construed liberally and a case ordinarily may not be appealed 
until a final judgment has been entered, even if the notice of 
appeal recites that the appeal is from the final order of the 
district court without mentioning any other order, 
interlocutory orders that are interdependent upon or necessary 
to the disposition in the final order usually are considered by a 
court of appeals as having been appealed.  See In re 
Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 706 (3d Cir. 1996).  
This case is a classic case for the application of the merger 
  21 
III.  STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND STANDARD 
OF REVIEW 
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291, because this appeal is from a final decision of the 
District Court, and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253, because this 
appeal is from the District Court‟s final order in a 28 U.S.C. § 
2254 habeas corpus proceeding.  We review a district court‟s 
factual findings on a clear error standard, Rolan v. Vaughn, 445 
F.3d 671, 677 (3d Cir. 2006), Love v. Morton, 112 F.3d 131, 
137 (3d Cir. 1997);
19
 but when the facts are determined by a 
district court, we review the application of the equitable 
principles implicated on the appeal on a de novo standard, 
Munchinski v. Wilson, 694 F.3d 308, 329 (3d Cir. 2012) (“‟[A] 
District Court‟s decision on the question of whether a case is 
sufficiently „extraordinary‟ to justify equitable tolling should be 
reviewed de novo.‟”) (quoting Brinson v. Vaughn, 398 F.3d 
225, 231 (3d Cir. 2005); Taylor v. Horn, 504 F.3d 416, 427 (3d 
                                                                                                             
rule as both of the District Court orders “produced the 
judgment.”  Id. 
 
19But see Rolan, 445 F.3d at 680-81 (A district court‟s 
findings of fact following an evidentiary hearing should not 
be disturbed absent clear error except where district court held 
a superfluous evidentiary hearing when there were legitimate 
and sufficient state court findings of fact in the record on the 
issue in question). 
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Cir. 2007)).
20
 
In applying the clear error standard of review, a 
reviewing court should “not disturb [a finding of a district court] 
unless it is wholly unsupported by the evidence.”  United States 
v. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 137, 183 (3d Cir. 2008).  Moreover, in 
making that review an appellate court ordinarily accepts a 
district court‟s credibility determinations.  See United States v. 
Marcavage, 609 F.3d 264, 281 (3d Cir. 2010).  
 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
On this appeal we consider two narrow issues, the first 
issue being in two parts:  
1.  Did the District Court clearly err when, after an 
evidentiary hearing, it made a factual determination that Ross 
attempted to prosecute a direct appeal for many years, including 
the period from 2004 to 2008, even though the record does not 
                                                 
20
As we noted in Munchinski, and contrary to the 
Commonwealth‟s assertion, we did not adopt the standard of 
de novo review of a grant of equitable tolling where the facts 
are not in dispute in Brinson, 398 F.3d at 231, but rather only 
suggested that de novo review was probably appropriate in 
that circumstance as it was not necessary to reach that issue in 
that case.  See Munchinski, 694 F.3d at 329 n.17.  Taylor later 
implicitly adopted the de novo standard.  504 F.3d at 427 n.6. 
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contain documentation to support the finding with respect to that 
four-year period?  In adjudicating this issue we consider Ross‟s 
testimony that he had made calls to Sheffield and had sent him 
correspondence during the 2004-2008 period and we also 
consider Sheffield‟s testimony that his office often did not 
accept inmates‟ calls, at least when he was not available, he did 
not remember much regarding Ross‟s attempts to contact him, 
and he may have lost documents during an office move.  Then, 
if we accept the District Court‟s factual findings with respect to 
Ross‟s efforts to prosecute his appeal, as we do, we decide 
whether Ross‟s efforts satisfied the reasonable diligence prong 
of the showing needed to obtain equitable tolling of the statute 
of limitations.  In making the determination with respect to the 
sufficiency of Ross‟s diligence, it does not matter whether we 
exercise a de novo or a deferential fact finding standard of 
review because our result is the same under both tests. 
2.  If we conclude that the District Court‟s factual 
findings in this case demonstrate that Ross acted with reasonable 
diligence, then exercising de novo review, we must determine 
whether extraordinary circumstances warranted equitable tolling 
of the statute of limitations.  In answering this question we 
consider that the record shows that (a) Ross regularly contacted 
Sheffield regarding his appeal, but Sheffield misled and lied to 
him, ignored his correspondence, refused his phone calls, and 
consulted with him in person only once during the eight years 
that he was Ross‟s attorney of record; (b) Ross has a history of 
mental illness; (c) Ross has limited cognitive abilities and 
education; (d) Ross is incarcerated and during the period of time 
in question was moved within the prison system, resulting in a 
loss of personal effects, including documents; (e) Ross 
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unsuccessfully requested the Common Pleas Court to appoint a 
new attorney for him; and, (f) in that denial, the court implied 
that Sheffield was taking steps to prosecute Ross‟s appeal, a 
suggestion that later turned out to be incorrect. 
The Commonwealth argues that the District Court erred 
in granting equitable tolling because Ross did not diligently 
pursue his case between February 2004 and April 15, 2008, 
when he wrote the clerk of the Common Pleas Court requesting 
information regarding the status of his appeal, and, therefore, 
Ross did not satisfy the “reasonable diligence” test required for 
equitable tolling.  Appellant‟s br. at 15.21  The Commonwealth 
more specifically alleges that this lack of diligence is evident 
because: (1) Ross did not file any complaint about Sheffield 
with the Pennsylvania attorney disciplinary authorities; (2) other 
than his first motion to have Sheffield removed in January 2001, 
Ross did not file a motion to have Sheffield removed; (3) Ross 
                                                 
21
The Commonwealth acknowledges in its brief that Ross 
demonstrated that certain of the requirements for equitable 
tolling were met for it recites that:  “Under the circumstances 
of this case, the Commonwealth does not dispute the 
extraordinary circumstances that appellee faced (namely, 
abandonment by appellate counsel Christopher Sheffield), but 
avers that the record establishes that appellee failed to 
exercise reasonable diligence. . . . [P]etitioner admittedly 
displayed diligence in keeping abreast of his case between 
2001 and 2004.”  Appellant‟s br. at 17. 
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was aware that he could seek relief under the PCRA at least as 
early as June 14, 2003, yet he did not file his pro se PCRA 
petition until 2008; and (4) Ross‟s letter of January 7, 2003, 
threatening to seek help by writing the federal courts indicates 
that Ross knew as early as 2003 that he had the right to pursue 
federal relief.  Appellant‟s br. at 20-22. 
Ross counters that the District Court credited his 
testimony at the hearing before the magistrate judge to the end 
that he regularly telephoned Sheffield and sent correspondence 
to him between 2004 and 2008, and argues that we should 
accept this factual determination, as it was not clearly erroneous. 
 Ross also contends that we should accept the District Court‟s 
conclusions that he was reasonably diligent in attempting to 
pursue his appeal, and that the circumstances he faced were 
extraordinary so that equitable tolling of the running of the 
statute of limitations was warranted.     
A person in custody pursuant to a judgment of a state 
court may apply for a writ of habeas corpus in a district court on 
the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution 
or laws or treaties of the United States, provided that he has 
exhausted the remedies available in the state courts, a state 
corrective process is not available, or there are circumstances 
that render the process to protect his rights ineffective.  28 
U.S.C. § 2254(a)-(b).  Ross has claimed that his trial counsel 
rendered ineffective assistance and that his appellate counsel, 
Sheffield, abandoned him during the proceedings on his state 
court appeal, and thus his rights under the Sixth Amendment 
  26 
were violated.
22
   
The Supreme Court “has recognized that the right to 
counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.  
Government violates the right to effective assistance when it 
interferes in certain ways with the ability of counsel to make 
independent decisions about how to conduct the defense.  
Counsel, however, can also deprive a defendant of the right to 
effective assistance, simply by failing to render adequate legal 
assistance.”  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685-86, 
104 S.Ct. 2052, 2063-64 (1984) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted) (citing and quoting McMann v. Richardson, 
397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 1449 n.14 (1970), and 
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344-50, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1716–
19 (1980)).  “The benchmark for judging any claim of 
ineffectiveness must be whether counsel‟s conduct so 
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process 
that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just 
result.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. 
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a 
petitioner must demonstrate that his counsel‟s performance fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness and that but for 
counsel‟s errors the result of the underlying proceeding would 
have been different.  Id. at 687-88, 104 S.Ct. at 2064.  The 
                                                 
22Of course, we do not address the question of whether his 
trial counsel had been ineffective inasmuch as in these habeas 
corpus proceedings we are concerned only with the question 
of whether Ross can pursue a direct appeal from his 
conviction. 
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Supreme Court has held that “when counsel‟s constitutionally 
deficient performance deprives a defendant of an appeal that he 
otherwise would have taken, the defendant has made out a 
successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim entitling him 
to an appeal.”  Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 484, 120 
S.Ct. 1029, 1039 (2000).  The defendant has the right to take 
this appeal because the “denial of the entire judicial proceeding 
itself, which a defendant wanted at the time and to which he had 
a right . . . demands a presumption of prejudice.   Put simply, we 
cannot accord any „presumption of reliability‟ to judicial 
proceedings that never took place.”  Id. at 483, 120 S.Ct. at 1038 
(citing Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 286, 120 S.Ct. 746, 764-
65 (2000)). 
A. Statute of limitations for filing a habeas 
corpus petition 
The AEDPA imposes a one-year limitation period for a 
state prisoner to file a federal habeas corpus petition which 
ordinarily starts to run from “the date on which the judgment 
became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration 
of the time for seeking such review.”  28 U.S.C. § 
2244(d)(1)(A).
23
  However, in Holland v. Florida, the Supreme 
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We need not discuss the circumstances in which the one-
year period runs from a date later than the date on which a 
judgment has become final inasmuch as Ross acknowledges 
that the only basis on which his habeas petition could have 
been timely is through the application of equitable tolling of 
the running of the statute of limitations and the parties have 
briefed the case addressing only that point.  We do not decide 
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Court, confirming the construction of the AEDPA by 11 courts 
of appeals, found that the AEDPA‟s one-year limitation period 
is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases.  130 S.Ct. 
2549, 2554, 2560 (2010).
24
   
B. Establishing that equitable tolling is 
warranted 
As summarized by the Supreme Court, “[g]enerally, a 
litigant seeking equitable tolling [of the AEDPA‟s one-year 
statute of limitations] bears the burden of establishing two 
elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and 
(2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.”  
Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418, 125 S.Ct. 1807, 1814 
(2005) (citing Irwin v. Dep‟t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 
96, 111 S. Ct. 453, 457-58 (1990)); see also Holland, 130 S.Ct. 
at 2562; Jenkins v. Superintendent of Laurel Highlands, 705 
                                                                                                             
a case by allowing equitable tolling if the habeas petition was 
timely by reason of statutory tolling.  See Jenkins v. 
Superintendent of Laurel Highlands, 705 F.3d 80, 88 (3d Cir. 
2013). 
 
24In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court reasoned that 
the AEDPA‟s statute of limitations defense is not 
jurisdictional, inflexibly requiring dismissal when the one-
year clock has run, and that a non-jurisdictional federal statute 
of limitations is normally subject to a rebuttable presumption 
in favor of equitable tolling.  It further noted that equitable 
principles traditionally have governed the substantive law in 
habeas corpus proceedings.  Holland, 130 S.Ct. at 2560-62. 
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F.3d 80, 89 (3d Cir. 2013); Pabon v. Mahanoy, 654 F.3d 385, 
399 (3d Cir. 2011). 
As with most issues involving a court‟s exercise of 
equitable powers, “[t]here are no bright lines in determining 
whether equitable tolling is warranted in a given case.”  Pabon, 
654 F.3d at 399.  In Holland, however, the Supreme Court 
emphasized that in considering whether there could be equitable 
tolling, courts should favor flexibility over adherence to 
mechanical rules.  130 S.Ct. at 2563.  In this regard, “the 
particular circumstances of each petitioner must be taken into 
account,” Pabon, 654 F.3d at 399, and each decision made on a 
“case-by-case basis.” Holland, 130 S.Ct. at 2563 (quoting 
Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375, 84 S.Ct. 1316, 1324 
(1964)).  Thus, we must “exercise judgment in light of prior 
precedent, but with awareness of the fact that specific 
circumstances, often hard to predict in advance, could warrant 
special treatment in an appropriate case.”  Holland, 130 S.Ct. at 
2563.  We have held that equitable tolling is appropriate when 
principles of equity would make the rigid application of a 
limitation period unfair, but that a court should be sparing in its 
use of the doctrine.  Pabon, 654 F.3d at 399; Jones v. Morton, 
195 F.3d 153, 159 (3d Cir. 1999).
25
 
                                                 
25
See also LaCava v. Kyler, 398 F.3d 271, 275 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(A court should apply equitable tolling “only in the rare 
situation where [it] is demanded by sound legal principles as 
well as the interests of justice.” (alteration in original)); 
Robinson v. Johnson, 313 F.3d 128, 142 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(“[W]e have cautioned that a statute of limitations should be 
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1.  The reasonable diligence prong of an 
equitable tolling showing 
          The diligence required for equitable tolling purposes is 
reasonable diligence, not maximum, extreme, or exceptional 
diligence.  Holland, 130 S.Ct. at 2565.
26
  “This obligation does 
not pertain solely to the filing of the federal habeas petition, 
rather it is an obligation that exists during the period appellant is 
exhausting state court remedies as well.”  LaCava v. Kyler, 398 
F.3d 271, 277 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Jones, 190 F.3d at 160).  A 
determination of whether a petitioner has exercised reasonable 
diligence is made under a subjective test: it must be considered 
                                                                                                             
tolled only in the rare situation where equitable tolling is 
demanded by sound legal principles as well as the interests of 
justice.” (quoting Jones, 195 F.3d at 159) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)).   
 
26
See also Baldayaque v. United States, 338 F.3d 145, 153 (2d 
Cir. 2003) (“The standard is not „extreme diligence‟ or 
„exceptional diligence,‟ it is reasonable diligence.  On 
remand, the district court should ask: did the petitioner act as 
diligently as reasonably could have been expected under the 
circumstances?”) (emphasis in original); see also Pace, 544 
U.S. at 419, 125 S.Ct. at 1815 (“Under long-established 
principles, petitioner‟s lack of diligence precludes equity‟s 
operation.”) (citing Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96, 111 S.Ct. at 457-58, 
and McQuiddy v. Ware, 87 U.S. 14, 20 Wall. 14, 19, 22 L.Ed. 
311 (1873) (“Equity always refuses to interfere where there 
has been gross laches in the prosecution of rights.” (internal 
citations omitted)). 
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in light of the particular circumstances of the case.  See 
Schlueter v. Varner, 384 F.3d 69, 74 (3d Cir. 2004) (“Due 
diligence does not require the maximum feasible diligence, but 
it does require diligence in the circumstances.”) (emphasis 
added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also 
Doe v. Busby, 661 F.3d 1001, 1013 (9th Cir. 2011) (“To 
determine if a petitioner has been diligent in pursuing his 
petition, courts consider the petitioner‟s overall level of care and 
caution in light of his or her particular circumstances.” 
(emphasis added)). 
The fact that a petitioner is proceeding pro se does not 
insulate him from the “reasonable diligence” inquiry and his 
lack of legal knowledge or legal training does not alone justify 
equitable tolling.  See Brown v. Shannon, 322 F.3d 768, 774 (3d 
Cir. 2003) (equitable tolling not justified where petitioner had 
one month left in limitations period in which he could have 
“fil[ed] at least a basic pro se habeas petition” at the time that 
petitioner‟s attorney informed him that he would not file an 
appeal in state court on his behalf and could no longer 
adequately represent him); see also Doe v. Menefee, 391 F.3d 
147, 177 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Given that we expect pro se 
petitioners to know when the limitations period expires . . . such 
inadvertence on Doe‟s part cannot constitute reasonable 
diligence.”). 
2.  The extraordinary circumstances 
prong of an equitable tolling showing 
We have recognized that in some cases an attorney‟s 
malfeasance, when combined with reasonable diligence on the 
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part of the petitioner in pursuit of his rights, may warrant 
equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.  Schlueter, 384 
F.3d at 76-77 (citing Seitzinger v. Reading Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 
165 F.3d 236, 239 (3d Cir. 1999)); see also Nara v. Frank, 264 
F.3d 310, 320-21 (3d Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by 
Carey v. Soffold, 536 U.S. 214, 122 S.Ct. 2134 (2002) (denial 
by district court of habeas petition was vacated, with the 
direction that an evidentiary hearing be held on whether the 
circumstances of attorney negligence warranted equitable tolling 
under the AEDPA).   
In 2010, the Supreme Court adopted this principle in 
Holland when it granted equitable tolling based on egregious 
attorney neglect amounting to extraordinary circumstances.  In 
Holland, the petitioner repeatedly had urged his attorney to take 
action on his appeal, and in his communications had provided 
instructions on the importance of filing a timely habeas corpus 
petition.  Nevertheless, the attorney ignored most of his 
communications, misstated the law in the few communications 
he did send the petitioner, and did not take the necessary steps to 
forward his client‟s appeal or preserve his client‟s right to 
appeal; moreover, the state courts denied the petitioner‟s 
attempts to have new counsel assigned.  Holland, 130 S.Ct. at 
2555-56.  
 3.  The findings of historical fact in this case 
The findings of fact that the magistrate judge outlined in 
his reports and recommendations that the District Court 
subsequently adopted were predicated on the evidence 
developed at the evidentiary hearing held before the magistrate 
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judge on November 3, 2011, and the state courts‟ records.  As 
we have indicated, such findings are subject to a deferential 
clear error review.  See Leeper v. United States, 756 F.2d 300, 
308 (3d Cir. 1985) (“The standard of review of factual findings 
does not envision an appellate court substituting its findings for 
that of the district court; rather it allows only an assessment of 
whether there is enough evidence on record to support such 
findings, regardless of whether different inferences could be 
drawn.”). 
After the evidentiary hearing to resolve factual issues 
held on November 3, 2011, the District Court made a factual 
determination that between the years 2004 and 2008, Ross had 
continued to pursue his appeal as he testified.  Although copies 
of correspondence and records of phone calls for the 2004-2008 
time period were not available, probably because of Ross‟s 
status as a prisoner and his moves within the prison system, the 
District Court concluded that Ross‟s testimony was credible.  
We cannot disturb that conclusion inasmuch as Sheffield 
testified that he did not remember certain events material to 
Ross‟s efforts and did not remember his own office‟s 
procedures.  Furthermore, Sheffield confirmed that his office 
sometimes refused to take inmate/client phone calls, and that he 
may have lost records during an office move and/or switching of 
computers.  Moreover, Sheffield was unable to answer questions 
concerning the appeals process from criminal convictions in 
Pennsylvania.   
The District Court‟s conclusions included factual 
findings that Sheffield‟s actions were confusing even to the 
Common Pleas Court causing it to offer (what turned out to be) 
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misleading information to Ross with respect to the status of his 
appeal that implied that it was being prosecuted, and that 
Sheffield‟s words and actions were artful and disingenuous 
throughout his representation of Ross.  Thus, in January 2001, 
about six months after the court assigned Sheffield to represent 
him, Ross requested the court to appoint new counsel for him 
but the court denied his application, explaining in its order that 
Sheffield had filed a motion to be permitted to file an appeal 
nunc pro tunc which the court had granted.  This information 
suggested to Ross that Sheffield was pursuing Ross‟s appeal 
diligently.  As a consequence of the court‟s action Ross felt 
chastened enough to write a letter apologizing to Sheffield.   
About five months later, on May 9, 2001, after a phone 
call from the court administrator, Sheffield explained in a letter 
to the state court that he had been waiting for the trial transcript, 
and that, although he admittedly had received that transcript, he 
was “not sure of the precise date that the Court Reporter placed 
the transcripts in my courthouse box.”  J.A. at 272.  Yet, the 
docket in the Common Pleas Court reveals that the transcript 
had been “lodged and filed” over a month earlier, on April 3, 
2001, and that when the court on December 13, 2000, ordered it 
filed, it also had ordered that an appeal nunc pro tunc “be filed 
no later than 30 days following the Defense counsel‟s receipt of 
the afore ordered trial transcripts.”  Id. at 266.  Sheffield in his 
letter of May 9, 2001, in explaining his tardiness, concluded that 
“[w]hile [he was] not yet ready to specifically itemize each 
appellate issue, [he would] file the Notice of Appeal 
immediately,” which, as stated above, he did that same day.  Id. 
at 272.  Despite this prodding by the court, almost another full 
month passed before Sheffield on June 8, 2001, visited Ross in 
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prison for the first and only time during the approximately eight-
year period that he was Ross‟s counsel of record.     
Thereafter, according to the findings of the District 
Court, Sheffield withdrew Ross‟s appeal (without Ross‟s 
knowledge) with the intended strategy of filing post-trial 
motions under the PCRA.  But Sheffield never filed another 
appeal or a collateral post-conviction petition on Ross‟s behalf.  
Inasmuch as the state court had granted Ross 30 days to file 
post-conviction motions from the date that the Superior Court 
allowed the withdrawal of his appeal which turned out to be 
September 4, 2001, the final date by which Sheffield should 
have filed a post-conviction motion was October 4, 2001.  
Sheffield, however, did not file any such motion.  In analyzing 
these facts for the purposes of assessing Ross‟s diligence and 
determining whether there were extraordinary circumstances in 
this case, the District Court concluded that “[t]he record of that 
state court representation is marked by a pattern of diligent 
efforts by Ross, a man of limited abilities, to preserve his 
appellate rights in the face of complete inaction by his counsel.” 
 Id. at 53.   
 Thus, the District Court made the historical factual 
determinations, after a hearing, that Ross regularly and 
repeatedly had attempted to pursue his appeal through letters 
and phone calls to his attorney and to the courts, and that he 
attempted to pursue his appeal during the time period between 
2004 and 2008.  In reviewing these factual determinations for 
clear error, we find none.
27
  As we noted in Leeper v. United 
                                                 
27The only circumstance that gives us pause in upholding the 
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States, “[t]he standard of review of factual findings does not 
envision an appellate court substituting its findings for that of 
the district court; rather it allows only an assessment of whether 
there is enough evidence on record to support such findings, 
regardless [of] whether different inferences could be drawn.”  
756 F.2d at 308.   
  4.  An evaluation of Ross‟s diligence 
We next turn to the question of whether the facts in the 
record, as the District Court found them to be, demonstrate that 
Ross exercised due diligence while exhausting his state 
remedies.  This is the aspect of the District Court‟s holding that 
the Commonwealth principally addresses.
28
  The District Court 
                                                                                                             
District Court‟s findings concerning Ross‟s diligence between 
2004 and 2008 in corresponding with Sheffield is that Ross‟s 
correspondence prior to that period was available even though 
the 2004-2008 correspondence was missing.  Our point is that 
it might be expected that if copies of the older correspondence 
were not lost, copies of the more recent correspondence 
would not have been lost.  Nevertheless, our concerns over 
this point are not sufficient to cause us to reject the District 
Court‟s findings with respect to Ross‟s diligence between 
2004 and 2008.   
 
28
The Commonwealth indicates that “[t]here is no explanation 
why appellee chose to file his pro se PCRA in 2008 instead of 
earlier in 2004 (or in 2005, 2006, or 2007, for that matter).  It 
is equally unclear why appellee delayed in filing his Petition 
for Writ of Habeas Corpus until May 2, 2011. . . . Between 
  37 
found that, despite the impediments he faced, Ross was duly 
diligent in his efforts to pursue his appeal but that he was misled 
as to the status of the appeal by Sheffield and by the Common 
Pleas Court‟s refusal to replace his attorney and its 
accompanying explanation that his attorney had obtained an 
order allowing Ross to appeal nunc pro tunc.  As stated above, 
the reasonable diligence showing that a petitioner must make to 
obtain equitable relief from the AEDPA statute of limitations is 
less than a showing of extraordinary diligence.  Even in a de 
novo review after having accepted the District Court‟s findings 
of fact, we conclude that Ross did exercise reasonable diligence 
in the circumstances that he faced.   We cannot, as the 
Commonwealth seems to suggest, expect Herculean efforts on 
the part of a lay person who is a convicted and incarcerated 
prisoner of limited cognitive abilities, and whose every attempt 
to pursue his appeal has been thwarted.  In the circumstances 
that he faced, Ross demonstrated perseverance and diligence. 
 5.  An evaluation of the circumstances that Ross 
faced 
Finally we consider whether or not the circumstances that 
Ross faced were “extraordinary” such that the second prong of 
the showing necessary to support equitable tolling has been met. 
                                                                                                             
2004 and 2008, a substantial period of time, appellee appears 
to have done none of these things, all of which could have 
been accomplished merely by writing a letter. . . . Based upon 
this record, appellee did not exercise reasonable diligence in 
bringing his claim.”  Appellant‟s br. at 21-22.                          
                                                                        
  38 
 A court measures the extraordinary circumstances prong 
subjectively.  In analyzing whether the circumstances Ross faced 
were extraordinary, “the proper inquiry is not how unusual the 
circumstance alleged to warrant tolling is among the universe of 
prisoners, . . . but rather how severe an obstacle it is for the 
prisoner endeavoring to comply with AEDPA‟s limitations 
period.”  Pabon, 654 F.3d at 400 (internal citations omitted) 
(emphasis in original).   
In addition, for a petitioner to obtain relief there must be 
a causal connection, or nexus, between the extraordinary 
circumstances he faced and the petitioner‟s failure to file a 
timely federal petition.  See Nara, 264 F.3d at 320 (The alleged 
extraordinary circumstance “must somehow have affected the 
petitioner‟s ability to file a timely habeas petition.”); see also 
Holland, 130 S.Ct. at 2562 (A petitioner must show that “some 
extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented 
timely filing.” (emphasis added and internal quotation marks 
omitted)).
29
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See also Harper v. Ercole, 648 F.3d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 2011) 
(“To secure equitable tolling, it is not enough for a party to 
show that he experienced extraordinary circumstances.  He 
must further demonstrate that those circumstances caused him 
to miss the original filing deadline.”); Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 
F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The prisoner must show that 
the extraordinary circumstances were the cause of his 
untimeliness.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Valverde 
v. Stinson, 224 F.3d 129, 134 (2d Cir. 2000) (“The word 
„prevent‟ requires the petitioner to demonstrate a causal 
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In this case, the District Court found that Ross‟s efforts 
were stymied by Sheffield‟s misleading statements on matters 
that should have been within Sheffield‟s knowledge, the 
Common Pleas Court‟s no doubt unintentionally misleading 
statement implying that Sheffield was prosecuting Ross‟s 
appeal, Sheffield‟s unresponsiveness and neglect of the case, 
and Ross‟s limited abilities.  The totality of these circumstances 
makes it clear that Ross satisfied the second prong of the 
showing required to justify equitable tolling of the running of 
the habeas corpus statute of limitations, i.e., that extraordinary 
circumstances stood in the way of Ross filing his direct appeal 
to the Superior Court. 
Our result is buttressed when we consider the record as a 
whole so far as it is germane to the circumstances that Ross 
faced.  We reiterate that Ross has a limited intellectual ability 
and education, a history of poor mental health, and is an 
incarcerated prisoner with limited resources at his disposal who 
was moved among facilities within the prison system.  These 
fundamental disadvantages were exacerbated by Sheffield‟s 
extreme neglect, including but not limited to his refusal to 
accept Ross‟s calls,30 overall failure to communicate with Ross, 
                                                                                                             
relationship between the extraordinary circumstances on 
which the claim for equitable tolling rests and the lateness of 
his filing, a demonstration that cannot be made if the 
petitioner, acting with reasonable diligence, could have filed 
on time notwithstanding the extraordinary circumstances.”). 
 
30We are not suggesting that an attorney always needs to 
accept his client‟s telephone calls.  Rather, we are indicating 
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inaccurate assurances regarding the status of Ross‟s appeal on 
those very limited occasions when he did communicate with 
Ross, and misstatements of the law.  In addition, the record 
reflects that Ross made an attempt to have the Common Pleas 
Court assign a new attorney to his case by filing a motion on 
January 5, 2001, asking for that relief, but that the court denied 
his motion in an order that implied that the court believed, albeit 
incorrectly, that Sheffield was moving Ross‟s case forward.   
Furthermore, it is a matter of great significance that 
shortly after the Common Pleas Court denied Ross‟s motion to 
replace Sheffield as Ross‟s attorney, Sheffield, without Ross‟s 
consent or even knowledge, reversed the very steps that he had 
taken on Ross‟s behalf and failed to pursue Ross‟s appeal 
through other means, all the while as Ross continued to make 
phone calls and write asking for updates on his case.  Overall, it 
is clear that the circumstances that Ross faced were quite 
extraordinary and, indeed, were similar to those the petitioner 
faced in Holland where his attorney‟s extreme neglect 
constituted extraordinary circumstances warranting the granting 
of equitable tolling.  Holland, 130 S.Ct. at 2564. 
Further, the nexus test is met because the extraordinary 
                                                                                                             
that Sheffield‟s office‟s repeated refusal to take Ross‟s calls, 
though perhaps sometimes justified by the circumstance that 
Sheffield was not in his office, in the circumstances of this 
case is another factor for us to consider in reviewing 
Sheffield‟s conduct to the extent that it relates to the 
extraordinary circumstances that Ross faced. 
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circumstances that Ross faced directly prevented him from 
timely pursuing his state court remedies and filing a statutorily 
timely habeas petition.  Therefore, it is appropriate in this case 
to equitably toll the running of the AEDPA‟s one-year statutory 
limitation period and to grant Ross substantive relief so that he 
can prosecute an appeal from his conviction and sentence in the 
state courts. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The District Court did not make a clear error following 
the evidentiary hearing of November 3, 2011, in its findings 
with respect to the efforts that Ross made in his attempt to 
prosecute his appeal, including those efforts in the period 
between 2004 and 2008.  Based on those findings and the record 
in this case, we are satisfied that, exercising either a deferential 
or de novo standard of review, Ross was duly diligent in 
prosecuting his appeal.  Sheffield, however, ignored Ross‟s 
efforts or misled him as to the status of his appeal.  Further, after 
conducting a de novo review, we agree with the District Court‟s 
legal conclusion that Ross faced such extraordinary 
circumstances that equitable tolling is warranted.  We therefore 
will affirm the District Court‟s orders granting equitable tolling 
of the statute of limitations and substantive habeas corpus relief, 
but we will instruct it to modify its order to the state court to 
reinstate Ross‟s appeal, and, instead, to order his release within 
90 days unless the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania reinstates 
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his appeal.
31
  We direct the Court to make this modification 
because principles of comity and jurisdiction prohibit a district 
court from ordering the reinstatement of a state court appeal: 
“[A] district court‟s power to grant a writ of habeas corpus 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is limited on this record to directing [the 
prisoner‟s] release from custody if the state fails to correct the 
constitutional violation.”  Barry v. Brower, 864 F.2d 294, 296 
(3d Cir. 1988).  Finally, we direct the Clerk of our Court to send 
a copy of this opinion to the Attorney Disciplinary Board of the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.   
 
 
                                                 
31
We recognize, however, that in this case the distinction 
between ordering a state court to take certain steps and 
ordering that a prisoner be released if it does not take those 
steps is immaterial because we have been informed that the 
Common Pleas Court has entered an order restoring Ross‟s 
appellate rights and Ross has appealed to the Superior Court, 
though the state courts have stayed proceedings on the appeal 
pending disposition of this appeal. 
